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NOTES
An Analysis of the Powers of Bail Bondsmen and
Possible Routes to Reform
"The professional bondsman is an anachronism in the criminal
process"'
This Note focuses on abuses of the powers of the bail bond
system and an analysis of reforms that could possibly be implemented
to make the system conform to our modem notions of constitutional
rights.2 Specific attention is paid to the system's use of bounty
hunters in apprehending
accused criminals who fail to appear at
3
scheduled court dates.
Over the past several decades, citizens have been increasingly
harmed by abuse of the broad powers of the bail bondsman and his
agent, the bounty hunter; 4 reform is strikingly needed.5 Part one of
this note discusses the history of the development of the powers of the
bonding industry and its use of bounty hunters in this nation. Part two
outlines several factors contributing to the need for reform. These
factors include: that the broad powers conferred to the bondsman
under the common law have resulted in widespread violation of

1Ford v. Hendrick, 257 A.2d 657, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (quoting A.B.A.
Standards Relating to Pretrial Release).
2 See id. (citing "the anomalous role of the bondsman in an era when
procedural rights of criminal defendants are so carefully protected."). As modem
constitutional doctrines have been developed by the Supreme Court, there have been
consistent trends toward greater constitutional limits over the powers exercised by the
Government. Cf Oregon v. Epps, 585 P.2d 425, 429 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (indicating that
"[t]he bondsman's powers conflict with the traditional safeguards that protect all
criminally accused during the process of extradition."); see also FrontierJustice: Bounty
Hunters are Lethal Anachronism, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (WORCESTER, MA), Sept. 9,
1997, at A8 [hereinafter FrontierJustice] (noting that "[i]n a nation founded on the
principles of due process and individual rights, there is no place for such a dangerous
throwback to shoot-first-ask-questions-later vigilante actions.").
3 See infra notes 23-173 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
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citizen's civil rights and constitutional rights; 6 that the bondsman
industry is an outdated relic of the past ruled by mobsters and rackets
which exercise more control over a suspect's freedom than a judge
does;7 and that commercial bonding has led to needless death and
injury and should be considered contrary to pubic policy.8 Part three
examines the outlawing of criminal bonding in several states, the
reform of the system in other states, and finally how some states have
viewed the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act as a scheme for
reformation of the system.
I. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL BONDING IN THE UNITED STATES

Today's commercial bail bond business is a product of the
English system of bail brought to this country over 200 years ago. 9
Under the British system, when a person was arrested and accused of

a crime, someone close to the accused, such as a family member,
would pledge land in exchange for the release of the accused until
trial.' 0 The accused is known as the "principal." If the accused failed
to appear in court at the date set for the trial, the party who pledged
responsibility for the principal could be forced to forfeit the property

he placed in the custody of the court, or perhaps face even harsher
penalties." The party accepting responsibility for the principal is
6 See

infra notes 114-136 and accompanying text.

7See infra notesl137-155 and accompanying text.

8See infra notes 156-173 and accompanying text.

9 The United States, as well as many other common law nations, inherited
their bail systems from England. See F. E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING 5-6
(1991); RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM 22 (1965) (indicating that "scholars have suggested
that modem bail comes from the old English laws governing debt"); Note, Bail: An
Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L. J. 966 (1961) (explaining that bail is derived
from the English common law).
10See DEVINE, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that bail was "a type of deed which
was used to encumber and later to discharge property") (emphasis added); GOLDFARB,
supra note 9, at 93 (stating that in England, "fear of forfeiture of land was a strong
incentive against jumping bond and fleeing").
1 See Thomas A. Sheehan, Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Analysis of Private
Remedies and State Action, 25.,WAsHBuRN L. J. 437, 438 (1986) (explaining that "[ulnder
early English law, if the accused did not appear at his court date . ..the bondsman
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known as the "surety."' 2 The burden of assuring that the principal
appeared at his trial date therefore passed from the court to the surety.

The evolution of bonding followed a very similar path as it
developed in this country.' 3 Instead of land being pledged in return
for release, a system reliant on monetary bail was created.' 4 When a

person is charged with an offense, the accused is placed in jail until a

judge can determine the most effective type of recognizance, 15 if one

is to be provided at all.' 6 The purpose of bail is to allow the charged
to go free to prepare a defense' 7 while concurrently assuring that he or
she will be present at the trial date.' 8 If it is determined that the
accused is eligible for monetary bail, there are two options available.

The accused can either place a sufficient sum of money or property in
the custody of the court or, resort to the services of a bail bondsman.
By charging a fee, 19 the bondsmen will put up the necessary cash to
himself sometimes was required to suffer any punishment which would have been
inflicted upon the principal, had he appeared.").
2 The person who pledges responsibility for the accused is known as the
,surety,' defined as "[olne who undertakes to pay money or perform other acts in the
event that his principal fails to. ." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 499,(1996).
13See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
14GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 93 (stating that "America was a young nation,
geographically far-flung, possessed of relatively unknown frontiers, and a potential haven
for fugitives from justice. The economic basis of American. society. was not land based
like that of the English feudal system.").
15See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding that the amount of bail
proscribed should be relevant to assuring that the accused appears at trial). "The practice
of admission to bail ... is not a device for keeping persons in jail .... The spirit of the
Id.
I...
at 7-8 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
procedure is to enable them to stay out ofjail .
16See id.at 6-7 (holding that "Federal law has unequivocally provided that a
person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.").
17See Sheehan, supra note II, at 438 (providing that other objectives of our
system of bail include: "insur[ing] society's interest in having the accused answer to a
criminal prosecution; to preserve the presumption of innocence; to permit the unhampered
preparation of a defense and to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.");
see also McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 515 (D. Neb. 1965)
(reasoning that "[olne purpose of allowing a person his liberty by the use of a bond is to
prevent such person from being imprisoned for an unnecessary length of time without the
Court losing the assurance that such person will appear in court at the appointed time.").
18See DEVINE, supra note 9, at 2-5.
19The fee paid by the principal on the bond is-usually 10% of the total cost of
the bond. See, e.g., Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971) (prior to 'Illinois'
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satisfy bail and release the accused until trial. 20 While the bondsman

is financially liable should the principal fail to appear,2' she is armed
with vast powers that can be used to recapture the principal and return

him to the custody of the court.22
One of the first cases to address these broad rights and
privileges afforded to the professional bondsman was Nicolls v.

Ingersol. 23 Nicolls was arrested in New Haven, Connecticut and
released on bail by Pierpoint Edwards. 24 After the parties entered into
this contractual relationship, 25 Edwards deputized the defendant and
others to capture the plaintiff at his home in New York.26 The bounty
hunters arrived at Nicolls' residence at approximately midnighe 7 and

proceeded to break down the door.28 Upon capturing Nicolls, the
defendant returned him to Connecticut. 29 Nicolls thereafter filed suit
claiming trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. 0
The Nicolls Court first examined whether the powers of the

surety to recapture a principal can be delegated to deputies or bounty
hunters. The court adhered to the rule that deputizing agents is within
the power of the bondsman. 3 1 It next determined that the bondsmen
enactment of the State's code of Criminal Procedure in 1964, the maximum bond fee
allowed by statute was 10% of the bond); DEVINE, supra note 9, at 8 (stating that "the
accused is charged a nonrefundable fee, commonly 10-15 percent of the amount of bail.").
20 See Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1979). "The
bondsman, in exchange for a fee and according to a contract, provides a service, obtaining
the principal's release from imprisonment." Id.
21Id.("The bondsman... owes a duty to the court and must suffer financial
penalty for failure
to perform that duty.").
22
See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
237 Johns. 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
24 Id. at 146.
25Id. at 154 (noting that, when examining the right of the surety to remove
the principal from the state, the right to surrender is not grounded in "judicial process, but
results from the nature of the undertaking by the bail."); see also Fitzpatrick v. Williams,
46 F.2d 40 (5th
26 Cir. 1931).
Nicolls v. Ingersol, 7 Johns. 145, 146-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
27
Id.at 147.
28 id.
29
Id at 148.
30
Id.at 145.
3 Nicolls, 7 Johns: at 153 (upholding the rule established by earlier cases that
"the general principle, [is] that the right to surrender results from the relation between the
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and his or her agents had the authority to remove the principal from
one state to return him or her to the jurisdiction where the bail was
33
issued 32 because the surety has total control over the principal.

Finally, the court upheld the power of the bondsman
to break and
34
enter the house of the principal to effect an arrest.
Approximately sixty years after the New York court's ruling
in Nicolls, the United States Supreme Court contemplated the powers

of the bail bondsman in a pair of influential cases. 35 The first case,
Reese v. United States,36 held that a surety is discharged from his
obligations when the government allows the principal to leave the
territory of the United States. 37 This is why the bondsman is given
powers to prevent his principal from leaving the jurisdiction and may
arrest and return him at any time.3
.
The second case is arguably the more influential of the two,
bail and principal; that it is to be effected as circumstances shall require, and is not a
personal power or authority, to be executed by the bail only.").
32See id. at 155 (ruling that examining previous cases "will render it obvious,
that the power with which he [the bondsman]is clothed is not one restricted in its exercise
to any particular place.").
33See id. (remarking that "bail [referring to the surety] ... are said to have
their principal upon a string, which they may pull whenever they please, and surrender
him in their own discharge." The court also noted that this authority derives from the fact
that "bail [the surety] are their principals' gaolers (sic), and that it is upon this notion that
they have an authority to take them.").
34See Nicolls, 7 Johns. at 156. "That the bail may break open the outer door
of the principal, if necessary, in order to arrest him, follows as a necessary consequence,
from the doctrine, that he has custody of the principal; his power is analogous to that of
the sheriff, who may break open an outer door to take a prisoner, who has escaped from
arrest." Id.

35See Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 13 (1869); Taylor v. Taintor,
83 U.S. (16 Wall) 366 (1872).
3676 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869).
37See id at 22 (reasoning that "[tihere is an implied covenant on the part of
the principal with his sureties, when he is admitted to bail, that he will not depart out of
this territory without their assent. There is also an implied covenant on the part of the
government, when the recognizance of bail is accepted, that it will not in any way
interfere with this covenant between them.").
38See id. at 21 (arguing that "he [the principal] is so far placed in their [the
bondsman's] power that they may at any time arrest him upon the recognizance and
surrender him to the court, and, to the extent necessary to accomplish this, may restrain
him of his liberty.").
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due to the fact that it has been successfully cited numerous times in
support of the broad powers afforded bondsmen. 39

In Taylor v.

Taintor,4 ° the principal was arrested in Connecticut on charges of
grand larceny. 4 1 After being released on $8,000 bond, he returned to
his home in New York.42 Upon returning home, he was arrested by
the authorities and extradited to Maine where he was imprisoned on
charges of burglary.43 While the holding of this case, like Reese,
focused on when the liability of the bondsman is discharged,44 it also
stated that the bondsman has extraordinary discretion in his power to
arrest and return the principal to the jurisdiction where he or she
stands accused.45 Several years after the decision in Taylor, the
Western District of Pennsylvania, in In re Von Der Ahe,46 reaffirmed
47
the powers of the criminal surety.
Most modem courts have upheld the bondsmen's common39 See, e.g., Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 597 (9th Cir. 1957); Hayes
v. Jeff Goldstein/ABC Bail Bonds, 1997 WL 840894, *1 (Ohio App. 1997); Umatilla
County v. Resolute Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 731, 732 (Or. App. 1972); Cosgrove v. Winney, 19
S. Ct. 598, 599 (1899); Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987); Golla v.
State, 135 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. 1957).
40 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
41 See id. at 368.
42 See id.
43

See id.
44 See id. at 369-71 ("They may doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits
of the State within which he is to answer but it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if
any evil ensue, they must bear the burden of the consequences .... ).
45 When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they
may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent.
They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him, on the
Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for
that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process.
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an
escaping prisoner.
Taylor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 371.
46 85 F. 959 (W.D. Pa. 1898).
47 See id. at 960-62 (indicating that the Von Der Ahe court explicitly relied on
the reasoning set forth in Nicolls and Taylor in coming to its decision).
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law right to arrest his principal.48 These courts have followed the
established common-law and stated that, because the powers of the
bondsman are created by contract, 49 a bondsman has a contractual
right to apprehend the principal in any state. Several courts, however,50
have imposed some minor limitations on the actions of bondsmen,
such as requiring that they act reasonably in executing their arrest
powers. 5 1 Because these powers arise from the contract between the

surety and the principal, the accused has traditionally had a poor
chance of recovering damages from the bondsman for civil rights
abuses 52 or state criminal violations like false imprisonment.5 3 These
48

See, e.g., Shifflet v. State, 560 A.2d 587, 590 (Md. 1989) (stating that

"under the law, the person who is in the position of serving as custodian of someone out
on bail, in other words the bail bondsman, has a contractual right to return that person to
the court."); Akins v. United States, 679 A.2d 1017, 1025 (D.C. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe Court
held long ago that a bail bondsman may seize the person without a warrant or other legal
process."); Fitzpatrick, 46 F.2d at 40-41 (holding that Taylor, Reese and In re Von Der
Ahe set out the bondsman's power to recapture his or her principal and carry him or her
across state lines without process to the jurisdiction where the charges stand); Curtis v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429, 435 (D. Minn. 1969) (reaffirming the powers of the
bondsman but holding that these powers are subject to a reasonableness requirement).
49 See Fitzpatrick, 46 F.2d at 40-41 (holding "[tlhe right to recapture his
principal is not a matter of criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking
implied in the furnishing of the bond.").
50 See Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that "[t]he
seemingly absolute powers granted to bondsmen at common law are not without
restriction and must be interpreted in light of modem common law and constitutional
principles.").
"' See id. at 802 ("[Tlhe common law right of recapture is limited by the
reasonable means necessary to effect the arrest."); Curtis, 299 F. Supp. at 435 (upholding
the bondsman's common law powers of arrest but subjecting these powers to "the bounds
of reasonable means needed"); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
("So long as the bounds of reasonable means needed to effect the apprehension are not
transgressed . . . sureties will not be liable for returning their principles to proper
custody.").
52See, e.g., Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 802 (holding that constitutional rights
are not violated if actions of bondsman are reasonable); Hunt v. Steve Dement Bail
Bonds, 914 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D. La. 1996) (holding no violation of civil rights because
bondsmen are not acting under 'color of state law'); Landry v. A-Able Bonding, 1994
WL 575480, *4 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (stating there is no fourth amendment violation because
the amendment does not "proscribe arrest by a private citizen").
53 See, e.g., Curtis, 299 F. Supp. at 435(finding no liability for false
imprisonment because recapture of the principal was within the powers of the bondsman,
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are but two of the reasons why there is a pressing need to54reevaluate
the powers granted to the bondsman in our modem society.

II. BONDSMAN AS STATE ACTORS
Aside from the limited state law actions which have been
brought against bondsmen and bounty hunters, 5' there has been a
general lack of consensus in the courts of whether the abuse of the
powers and privileges granted to criminal sureties are actionable under
federal civil rights law.56 Because this point of law is generally
unsettled, citizens are being searched and arrested by other private
citizens, which has traditionally been a power of the sovereign,
without access to procedural safeguards provided by the
57
Constitution.
The Constitution of the United States provides the safeguards
of the Fourth Amendment to protect the people from overzealous
agents of government invading their privacy.5 8 These protections are
applicable to the states as well through the Incorporation Clause of the
Additionally, Congress has enacted
Fourteenth Amendment.
legislation to protect citizens' civil rights.5 9 All of these protections,
assuming the arrest was effected by reasonable means).
14 See infra notes 114-75 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
56 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 58-175 and accompanying text.
58 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

59 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a remedy for
citizens who have had their civil rights violated. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
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however, apply solely to the government and its agents. "A private
individual's actions, no matter how egregious will not be held to have
60
violated the injured party's constitutional rights."
Under a federal civil rights claim, there are three elements that
must be satisfied to prove that a plaintiffs civil rights have been
violated. 6 1 The first factor is that "the [bondsman's] intentionally
committed acts ...violated one or more of [the principal's] federal
rights." 62 Secondly, the plaintiff must show that "in doing so, [the
63
bounty hunter] acted 'under color' of authority of state law."
Finally, the injured party (i.e., the principal) must show that the
64
"[bondsman's] acts were the legal cause of [the] . . . damages.'
Elements one and three are the easiest to fulfill, and evidence of their
violation is usually apparent on the face of the case.65 The second
element, however, is much more difficult to establish.66
State action is necessary for a civil rights action to stand. Its
presence is also necessary to find a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. There is usually no question that state action is present
when an agent of the government, such as a police officer or elected
official, commits a violation. Problems arise, however, when it is
unclear whether a party's actions can be fairly attributed to the state,
such as when a bondsman arrests a principal who fails to appear in
court. 67 "In order to determine if the actions of bail bondsmen
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
60Sheehan, supra note 11, at 448.
61See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
62 Hunt, 914 F. Supp. at 1392.
63 See id.

64See id
65See, e.g., id.(satisfaction of elements one and two were obvious by the fact
that the defendants broke and entered the plaintiffs house in search of a third party).
66See generally id. at 1393. The Court stated that "[tihe only pertinent issue
is whether the second element is satisfied." Id.
67 Compare, Cramblit v. Fikse, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28343 (6th Cir. 1992)
(stating bondsmen are not state actors); Easley v. Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D.
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constitute state action, [thereby allowing citizens to recover when
harmed by bondsmen], it is necessary to analyze their work in light of
common law doctrines created by the Supreme Court to test for state
action.

68

Over the past several decades, the modern Supreme Court has
developed and revised the requisite criteria necessary to find state
action on behalf of a private party and, thus, satisfy the second
element of a § 1983 claim. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,69 the
Court laid out the components of the multipart test that has been used

to determine whether state action is present. 70 First, the depravation
of the rights of the victim (i.e., the principal) must have been caused
by "the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State, or by a
rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible.",7 1 Next, the victim must show that the actor can
be fairly identified as an arm of the state.7 2 The showing of a state

statute that authorizes the actions of the bounty hunter usually satisfies
the first element." The reviewing court must then carefully examine
the actions of the defendant 74 by applying four tests to determine
Fl. 1975) (stating no state action present in the actions of bondsmen); Ouzts v. Maryland
Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1974); Curtis, 299 F. Supp. at 443; with,
Landry v. A-Able Bonding Inc., 1994 WL 575480 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding the actions
of bondsmen are fairly attributable to the state); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D.
Penn. 1970) (stating bondsmen act under color of law).
68 Sheehan, supra note 11, at 449.
69 457 U.S. 922 (1982).

70 See id at 937. "These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of
'fair attribution."' Id.
"' Id. at 937.

72 See Id. ("[T]he party charged with the depravation must be a person who
may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because
he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because
his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.").
71 See Smith, 333 F. Supp. at 38 (lodging of bail is an act under color of state
law); Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 800 (stating the fact that bondsmen possessed and used a
bench warrant in apprehending the principal is an act under color of law). But see Easley,
394 F. Supp. at 345 (although the actions of bail bondsmen are regulated by state statute,
this court elects to follow the precedent, without its own analysis, that the actions of
bondsmen are not state action).
7 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (quoting Flag Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978)) (stating that "[a]ction by a private party pursuant to this statute, without
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whether his or her action can be attributed to the state.75 These tests
include: the "public function" test, 76 the "state compulsion" test,77 the
"nexus" 78 or "symbiosis" test and the "joint action" test.79 The Lugar
Court, however, did not articulate which of the particular tests are to
be used in any given situation. 80 It is unclear whether one or all of the
tests apply to a given set of facts.8 ' By applying the "symbiosis" test
to the actions of bail bondsmen and bounty hunters, the following
analysis will demonstrate that "[t]he state has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence" with the commercial bail bond
system that "it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the
'' 2
challenged activity.
The leading case on the application of the symbiosis test to the
83
actions of private actors is Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,
which the Supreme Court heard on certiorarito the Supreme Court of
Delaware. 4 In Burton, the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency
something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a 'state
actor.' The Court suggested that that 'something more' which would convert the private
party into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case.").
75 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. "[Tlhe court has articulated a number of
different factors or tests in different contexts." ld; see also Mary Lee Doane, Liability of
Bail Bondsmen Under Section 1983, 42 WASH. AND LEE L. R. 215, 228-29 (1985)
(outlining the four tests that may be applied to determine whether state action is present).
76 See Doane, supra note 75, at 228 (testing whether the power is reserved for
the government).
77 Sed id. at 228-29 (testing whether the state coerced or encouraged the
action).
78 See id. at 229 (testing whether the state is inexorably intertwined with the
actions of the private party).
71See id. (testing whether the state is acting jointly with the private party).
80See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (stating that "[wihether these different tests are
actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily
fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved
here.").
81 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
(regarding which test to use, the Court stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance").
82 Id. at 725; see also infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
83 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14 See id. at 715.
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of the State of Delaware, leased out portions of its new parking
facility in order to generate-. sufficient revenues to pay back
construction bond obligations.8 5 One of the tenants of this new
facility was Eagle Coffee Shops, Inc.8 6 Eagle Coffee refused to
extend its service to an African-American customer, who then sued
the store claiming that the refusal was a violation of his civil rights. s7
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's holding that state action
was not present. 88 In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to
several factors including:
that the land and the building were publicly owned,..
[t]he costs of land acquisition, construction, and
maintenance are defrayed entirely from donations by
the City of Wilmington, from loans and revenue
bonds,. .. [u]pkeep and maintenance of the building,
including necessary repairs, were responsibilities of
the Authority and payable out of public funds,

.

.. and

profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to,
but are also indispensable elements89 in, the financial
success of 'the' government agency.
It then concluded that the relationship between the business
and the parking facility were so intertwined as to impute the
discriminatory practices of the former to the latter.90 The "intertwined
85 See

id. at 717-19.

86 See id.
87 See
8 See

id. at 720 (the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Burton, 365 U.S. at 717.
89 Id. at 723-24.
90 See id. at 723-25 (finding state action on the part of Eagle Coffee, the
Court announced that "it cannot be doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant
to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of
benefits ... [t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." ); see also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 498 (1983) (stating that "[iut might be said that where there are
sufficient contacts between a private individual and the government, then that the private
individual take on at least the appearance of not the actual authority of the state. Where
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relationship" between the state and a private party was the critical
element in the Court's conclusion that state action was present in the

actions of the private coffee shop. 9' By analyzing the actions of
criminal sureties under the logic set forth in Burton, it becomes
apparent that an "intertwined relationship" exists between the
government and criminal sureties, necessarily making the actions of
92
bondsmen "state action."
First, the State criminal justice system receives a benefit from
the use of bail bondsmen. 93 As our country grows, the costs of
imprisoning a person have risen dramatically. 94 Dwindling resources
have forced police to look for enforcement alternatives to cut their
costs. 95 By using the surety to secure the release of the accused prior
96
to trial, the State is not forced to expend money on incarceration;

especially on someone who is possibly innocent of committing a
crime. 97 The bounty hunter also plays an imrortant role in retrieving
fugitives who fail to appear at their hearings. 9' If they did not perform
the actions provide some tangible aid to both the alleged wrongdoer and the government,
the two have come to be in a type of 'symbiotic relationship."').
91See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25.
92 See infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
93 See generally, Mary A. Toberg, Bail Bondsmen and Criminal Courts, 8
JUST. SYS. J. 141 (1983) (discussing many of the benefits offered by State use of bail
bondsmen and showing generally poor results in states that have eliminated them).
94 See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 32-91 (outlining the various
costs of pre-trial detention).
95 See Toberg, supra note 93, at 143 (arguing that "the scarce resources
available in many jurisdictions for serving warrants creates an incentive for law
enforcement officers to rely on bondsmen as much as possible to return defendants to
court.").
96 See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 557 (Hufstedler, J. dissenting) (arguing that "[b]y
permitting a defendant to be released into the custody of a private surety, the state saves
the expense that it would otherwise incur in constructing additional jail facilities, feeding
and clothing the prisoner, and using its own governmental personnel to guard the
defendant and insure his appearance in court."), see also Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v.
Goldfarb, 278 N.W.2d 653, 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (supporting the logic behind
Justice Hufstedler's dissent in Ouzts).
97 See DEVINE, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that pre-trial detention is essentially
the equivalent of punishment without proof of guilt). Since it naturally follows that some
accused are eventually exonerated, pre-trial detention forces the state to expend resources
on innocent citizens. Id.
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this function, it would be the role of the police to discharge this
responsibility. These factors lend support to the notion that the act of
arresting a fugitive, traditionally a power of the state, takes place
under "color of law." 99
Many courts.have likened the role of the surety to that of a
jailer. 00 In doing so, the bondsman is once again performing a job
that would otherwise be performed by the state. 01 Essentially, the
bail bondsman is granted powers traditionally reserved by the
sovereign.' 0 2 This grant of power
has been viewed as a significant
03
factor in determining state action.'
Judges also gain a benefit by using the bondsman. The
judiciary is frequently placed in the difficult situation where setting

98See Toberg, supra note 93, at 142-43. "If a defendant does not appear for
court, the bondsman will usually try to locate the individual. Many defendants are easily
found and return to court of their own volition ....Other defendants are more difficult to
locate and may require an extensive search." Id.
99 This is the case when a defendant is released on his or her own
recognizance. Since no surety is involved, it is the role of the police to return the fugitive
to stand trial. See DEVINE, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that police are responsible for
fugitive retrieval when there is no bond involved).
1ooSee, e.g., Taylor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 371 (stating that when one is
released on bail, he is in the "custody of his sureties [who] may seize and deliver him up
in their discharge and.., imprison him until it may be done").
'0' See Goldfarb, 278 N.W.2d at 671 (concluding that "[bly arranging for the
pretrial release of the accused, he relieves the state of the onus of caring for a defendant in
custody, and in essence continues the original imprisonment"); see also Ouzts, 505 F.2d
at 562 (Merrill, J., dissenting). "The history of state reliance on private action to assure
the return of an accused and the extent to which states have grown to rely on this manner
of implementing a system of bail place the bondsman in a position where he 'discharges a
function or performs a service that would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the
State."' Id.
102See Goldfarb, 278 N.W.2d at 670 (holding that "professional bondsmen..
* exercise a power which is clearly a traditional adjunct of the state's sovereignty: the
power to arrest. The bondsmen's power extends far beyond the limited power to arrest
granted by statute to the ordinary citizen and is free of the procedural safeguards which
carefully control civil arrest.").
'03 See id. at 669. "The court indicated that the furnishing of services or
exercise of powers traditionally with the sovereign, the existence of a symbiotic or
interdependent relationship between the state and the private party and the overt or covert
approval of the practice by the state, were significant". Id.
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bail prohibitively high will draw criticism.10 4 By having the
bondsman simply refuse to write a bond, a judge may keep 10 the
5
accused criminal in jail without receiving any "adverse publicity."'
Indeed, many benefits flow to the bondsman as well in our
system of commercial bail bonding.10 6 Because the courts use
commercial bonding as a form of pretrial recognizance, the bondsman
is able to exist.10 7 For a relatively small amount of risk,'0 8 the surety
is reaping enormous profits from the criminal justice system. 0 9 By
providing them with broad powers of arrest, the state has assured that
they will continue to benefit from writing bonds, even at the expense
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
105See GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 112 (staing that "[b]ondsmen need the
104

court's cooperation in numerous ways from time to time and will try not to offend a judge
before whom they have frequent business. A judge can effectively see to it that bail is
denied in a given case without subjecting himself [or herself] to criticism for denying
bail."); see also Toberg, supra note 93, at 143. "By setting bail, a judge shares the
responsibility for a defendant's release with both the bondsman and individuals who
become parties to the bond, such as the defendant's relatives or friends, who may cosign
the bind or provide collateral for it. This furnishes the judge with a "buffer" against any
adverse publicity that may arise, if a released defendant commits a heinous crime prior to
trial." Id.
'06See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
107See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 557 (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "only
through substantial governmental cooperation is it possible to maintain the system of
quasi-private bail...").
"0'See GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 95-102 (exposing that because the bond
agents and the companies that insure them require indemnification, "no one from the
bondsman up needs run any risk of loss").
109 See id. at 96. "One prominent bond-business figure, an insurance
executive, has reported that all companies in the country that are writing bail bonds make
a total profit of $4,500,000 a year. The agents writing the bonds make a total profit of
$22,500,000." Id.; Christian Parenti, 'I Hunt Men': Meet the Self-Ordained Officers of
the Bail-Bond Industry, THE PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1997 at 2 1.
In 1994 bounty hunters- in the service of the nation's 8,500 bail
agents - arrested more than 24,000 bail fugitives. California has
1,350 such agents employed by 300 bail-bond companies, which
make a $110 to $120 million profit annually, according to the
California Bail Agents Association. That's 10 percent of the $1.2
billion worth of bail written in California each year. Nationally,
bail is a $4-billion-a-year industry, netting $400 million a year in
profits, 'with California, Florida and Texas the national leaders.
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of public safety." 0 The bondsman is inextricably I Itied into our
criminal justice system; one is the product of the other.
Because the criminal justice system and the commercial
bonding system are so dependant upon one another, the actions of
bondsmen should be imputed to the state for purposes of finding that
bondsmen act "under color of law.""11 2 If this is true, the following
discussion will demonstrate that bondsmen violate citizens' civil
rights and other protections afforded by the Constitution when they
3
perform arrests and searches without warrants or other process."
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A perfect example of bondsmen committing constitutional
violations is presented in Akins v. United States." 4 The Court of
110See infra notes 114-137,.156-171 and accompanying text. The state
allows the bondsman to operate at the expense of the public due to the benefits it receives
in return. Id.
111See GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 102 (stating that "[olur system [of
criminal justice] created him [the bail bondman]. Bondsmen are products of our uniquely
commercialized administration of justice, just as prohibition created the racketeers who
preyed on the society that gave them birth.").
112"The relationship between bondsmen and criminal courts ... has often
been a symbiotic one, in which the actions of the courts have enhanced the profitability of
bondsmen's operations, which in turn have facilitated the actions of the courts." Toberg,
supra note 93, at 141.
"' See, e.g., Hill, 320 F. Supp. at 185.
114679 A.2d 1017 (D.C. App. 1996). In Akins the Defendant, along with
several of his companions were travelling the streets of Washington, D.C. looking for
people to rob. Id. at 1021. The group found Charles Lawson and proceeded to beat him
to the point of unconsciousness; all the events were being videotaped by one of the
coconspirators. Id. at 1021-22. A bounty hunter was hired several weeks after the
incident to locate one of Akin's codefendants, Joel Carrero, who had failed to appear at
trial for an unrelated offense. Id.at 1022. The search for Carrero led the bounty hunter to
an apartment in New York City where the bounty hunter broke and entered the residence.
Id.at 1022. The bounty hunter, joined by the bail bondsman, stayed in the residence for
several days where they ate, slept and watched videos. Id.at 1022. With the aid of
Carrero's brother who returned to the apartment, the bounty hunters found the videotaped
assault and battery of Lawson and turned it into the Metro D.C. police. Id. at 1022. The
videotape was eventually used to convict the defendants of conspiracy to commit robbery.
Id. at 1023.

BAIL BONDSMEN

1999]

303

Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the judgment of the trial
court that the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated."15 Because the bounty hunters were "private actors with a
contractual relationship,""16 damaging evidence retrieved by them
while breaking and entering was "not controlled by the evidencegathering guidelines applicable to state action that have evolved from
the Fourth Amendment."'"17 Akins shows that while bounty hunters
and bail bondsmen have an intimate relationship with the state in the
form of retrieving fugitives and gathering evidence, 1 8 they are not
held to the same procedural safeguards that police and other
traditional state actors must comport with. 19 The court defaulted to
the century old logic set forth in Nicolls2 ° and Von Der Ahe,121 that
"bail bondsmen ...[are] private actors with a contractual relationship
..and thus were not controlled by the evidence-gathering guidelines

applicable to ' 22state action that have evolved from the Fourth
Amendment."'
Had the bondsmen in Akins been viewed as acting under color
of state law, as the previous argument suggests, the evidence gathered
would have been inadmissible due to the fact that it was gathered from
the apartment without a warrant. The court erred in refusing to
acknowledge that bondsmen are acting under "color of law."' 23 "It is
myopic of the judiciary, in addressing the scope of the bondsman's
authority of retrieval, to emphasize the contractual relationship
"s

See id. at 1036.

116Akins, 679 A.2d at 1025.
117Id.

118See id. The relationship here not only included the arrest of criminal
fugitive, but the recovery of evidence which the state used to convict the plaintiff-in-error.
Id.
"9 See id. at 1025. The court stated that it "perceived no authority for
departing from the well-established rule that bondsmen are not subject to the Fourth
Amendment as it regards the seizure of personal effects." Id.
120 7 Johns. 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).

12185 F. 959 (W.D. Pa. 1898).
122Akins, 679 A.2d at 1025.
123See id.The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the bondsmen were not state

actors and that "actions taken by private parties are not limited by the constraints placed
on government agents by the Fourth Amendment." Id.
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between the surety and the principal while simultaneously ignoring
the existence of the sovereign as an active party to the contract.' ' 4
Akins and other courts have held that constitutional rights are
violated only if the police are somehow involved. 2 5 Allowing
violations of citizens' Fourth Amendment rights, as demonstrated in
Akins, 126 seems to. go against the spirit of our constitutional
democracy. 127 As the court in Ford v. Hendrick128 stated, "on balance
with our concern for constitutional rights, we should not sanction
professional bounty hunters who are unrestrained by constitutional

limitations. Such a task is more properly the concern of the police.'

29

The government is granting a private party powers traditionally
reserved for the sovereign, while at the same time failing to provide
safeguards for the abuse of that power. 130 By realizing that bondsmen
are involved in a symbiotic relationship with the government and,
therefore,. subject to constitutional restraints,' 3' society can gain the
benefits of commercial bonding while being protected from the evils
of the system.
Another example of bondsmen committing unconstitutional
acts is Hill v. Toll.132 In violation of the bond contract, bounty hunters
124Jim Hansen, The Professional Bondsman: A State Action Analysis, 30
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 595, 611(1981).
25 See id. at 1026.. "[Ajbsent specific encouragement or involvement by law
enforcement officers to recover evidence while in pursuit of a principal, neither a bail
bondsman nor his bounty hunter are bound by the constraints of the Fourth Amendment"
Id.; see also Landry, 1994 WL575480, *7 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (discussing that "[hiad
Burrow [the bounty hunter whose actions are at issue] involved Louisiana or local law
enforcement personnel, had he purported to execute the bench warrant, or used it in any
way to regain custody of Landry [the principal], the state action issue would be couched
in a context more favorable to Landry.").
126 See Akins, 679 A.2d at 1036 (upholding the conviction of Akins even
though evidence used at trial-was seized by bondsmen without a warrant).
127 See Ford,257 A.2d at 668.
128257 A.2d 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969).
129 Id. at 668-69.
130 See generally North Carolina v. Carroll, 204 S.E.2d 908, 909 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1974) (holding, in part, that when police officers enter private property and act as
bounty hunters attempting to retrieve fugitives, their actions are controlled by the
Constitution).
13' See supra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
132320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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forcibly seized the plaintiff from his home.' 33 Upon transporting him
to the Philadelphia Detention center, they proceeded to beat him. 134 In
examining whether the bondsmen acted under "color of law," the
court stated that "the inquiry ... is not whether the actor is a public
official, but whether there is sufficient state involvement in the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct."' 35 It found that the bondsmen,
acting pursuant, to state statute, were state actors and liable for the
violation of the plaintiffs civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.136 This
decision allows victims to rightly recover damages for the violation of
their civil rights.
Departing from -constitutional violations that bondsmen are
perpetrating on society, reform is also needed because the current
system is an outdated one that is corrupt and infiltrated by
criminals. 37 Since commercial bail bonding is such a lucrative and
relatively unregulated business,' 3 8 it is a perfect enterprise of aspiring
criminals and established rackets alike.' 39 When a criminal enterprise
becomes involved in the bond business, its members are assured of
pre-trial release for a minor fee or no fee at all. 140 In fact,
investigation by the IndianapolisStar has revealed
that, in Cleveland, racketeers had organized a twentythree state bail-bond syndicate that wrote $8 million
This
Worth, of bail "in an eight-month period.
133
See id. at 186.
134See id.

...
Id. at 187.
136
See id.

137 Many professional bounty hunters are themselves former criminals or exconvicts. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 101 (1965) (stating that "many are 'lowlifes' (sic) whose very presence contaminates the judicial process").
138 See Jeff Barker, U.S. Attorney Looks at Bounty Hunters, ARIZONA

REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1997, at BI (stating there are no federal statutes controlling the actions
of bounty hunters).

131See GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 102 (discussing the extensive criminal
infiltration of the criminal bail bonding business).
140 See id. at 103 (discussing the fact that not only does getting involved in
bail bonding give criminal enterprises a steady infusion of capital, it "also provides crime
syndicates with perfect springboards to freedom for their members").
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syndicate was reportedly run by 'a big time hoodlum'
and convicted felon, and a convicted arms smuggler

who it was said spared no14efforts
to gain a monopoly
1
over the bonding business.

Corruption is also present in the relationship between the
42
bondsman and court actors such as judges, clerks and police.
Evidence exists that some judges accept bribes from bondsmen and
that the corruption has been present for many years. 143 These crimes
141Id. at 103.

142See id.at 109. Various papers throughout the nation over the past several
years have revealed other numerous allegations and convictions of bondsmen and police
working together in corrupt enterprises. See, e.g., Homer Clonts, Snowy Search Ended in
Sadness in 1970, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1995, at Al2.
[A] News-Sentinel expose of alleged corruption in law
enforcement in Cocke County begun more than six months
earlier reached a climax. Eleven officers and a bail bondsman
were arrested on federal conspiracy charges. A year long
investigation by the FBI and other federal investigators led to the
arrest of 16 persons charged with making fraudulent claims to
the government in connection with relocating persons from
Knoxville's Mountain View Urban Renewal Area.
Id.; John Murawski, Ongoing Probe Into Court Bribes Snags a Clerk, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
8, 1993 at 23.
A two year long investigation by local law enforcement
authorities into alleged payoffs by bail bondsmen to D.C.
Superior Court employees has produced a second guilty plea.
On March 1, former courtroom clerk Herman Smith, a 25-year
veteran of Superior Court, pleaded guilty to a felony charge of
forging public records. By forging judges' signatures in the
[case] jackets, Smith, who retired in January, set aside $49,500 in
forfeited bonds for three surety agents.
Id.; cf.Jackson Diehl, Sen. BroadwaterApparently Lien in Bail Affidavits, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1980, at CI (discussing how "State Sen. Tommie Broadwater (D-Prince
Geo'ge's), a prominent local bail bondsman, has routinely signed sworn affidavits
declaring that he has no bail bond debts when he owes the courts thousands of dollars for
clients who jumped bail.").
143See, e.g., David Barstow, Bonanno Investigated in Mid-1980s, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1992, at lB. The article examines the longstanding
corruption investigation of Hillsborough Judge Robert H. Bonanno. Id. One of the
alleged schemes carried out by Judge Bonanno involves accepting "bribes to release
defendants from jail on their own recognizance until trial ...the jail release scheme
allegedly involved Bonanno's friend Lenny Perez and a bail bondsman." Id."According
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are coming to light as widespread investigation of corruption in the
judiciary is being conducted across the country.'44 Several years ago,
a Cleveland police sting operation revealed collusion between police
and bounty hunters to gain protection for carrying out illegal
activities.1 45
Questions concerning corrupt relations between
authorities and bondsmen have also been raised by the activities of
Georgia State Patrol Commander Colonel Bowman.
Bowman

supervised an inordinate number of roadblocks in Catoosa County
where he served as sheriff before moving to the state level. 4 6 One
report states that "Catoosa bondsmen do more business in one night of
DUI sweeps than they do during an average week."' 14 7 It appears
Colonel Bowman may have been acting in concert with bail
bondsmen in deciding when to set. up the checkpoints. 148 Another
example of corruption is the reportedly frequent,
and illegal, practice
4
of bondsmen giving gifts to state officials. 5
to complaints received by detectives, Perez *would contact Bonanno on the bail
bondsman's behalf and arrange the release of certain defendants. Then the three would
split the payoff from the defendant." Id.; see also Jeff Leen, Bribe Investigation Targets
Morphonios, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at Al (reporting that "[flormer Dade County
(Fla.) Circuit Judge Ellen Morphonios, nationally renowned for her tough stance on
crime, reportedly is under federal investigation for allegedly taking bribes from bondsmen
144 See, e.g., Leen, supra note 143, at Al (explaining that "[o]peration Court
Broom, [is a] massive state and federal investigation of corruption in Dade county judicial
system ....
145See Mark Rollenhagen, Former Informant to FBI Now Fugitive, PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 8, 1995, at IB (reporting that "[d]ownie [a former FBI informant] played a
key role in.
the Cleveland police sting by introducing the undercover agents to bail
bondsman Reginald Crosby. Crosby then arranged for Cleveland police to protect the
undercover gambling operation and a shipment of marijuana.").
146 See John Harmon, Patrol Chief Says 'Jealousy' Causes Charges of
Kickbacks, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Dec. 29, 1992, at 3.
147id.

148 See id (stating "the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service are
investigating whether Colonel Bowman, while sheriff from 1986 until 1991, took
kickbacks from an unnamed local bail bondsman.").
149See Skip Hess, Bail Bond Agents Get Warning; Gifts to Officials Can
Result in Prosecution, Memo Says, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Dec. 16, 1994, at Cl. This

article examines the practice of bondsmen giving gifts to police and other public officials
in Indiana, which is forbidden under the Indiana Administrative Code. Id. The author
specifically examines the actions of Johnson County Sheriff Doran Miller, who has an

308

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XV

One of the biggest displays of bondsman sponsored corruption
recently took place in Arizona in what has become known as
"AzScam."'' 50 Seeking to weed out corruption in the Arizona State
legislature, Maricopa County prosecutors and Phoenix Police
detectives enlisted an ex-convict to play the part of J. Anthony
Vincent. 151 He acted as a supposed mob-type who was looking to
bribe members of the legislature in order to ensure a legalized
gambling bill would be passed.15 2 He enlisted the aid of a bail

bondsman to determine which legislators could be bribed into
supporting casinos in the state.153 The bail bondsman was convicted
of leading organized crime,, money laundering, offering to exert
improper influence on a public servant and six counts of bribery of a
public servant."' 5 4 The system of commercial bail bonding has
spurred criminal activity and corruption.155 These are not practices
our system of justice should perpetuate. Serious reform is needed if
we are to eliminate these criminal elements.
A third distinct factor contributing to the need for reform is
the growing number of people falling victim to needless violence
committed by bondsmen and bounty hunters. 5 6 In addition to
extensive record of accepting contributions and "tips" from local bondsmen. Id.
'50 See Pamela Manson and Kris Mayes, AzScam: Could Scandal Happen
Again?; Lessons, Temptations Debated in Aftermath, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1996,

at AI (noting that "[t]he bribes-for-votes scandal introduced a new word to the Arizona
language, AzScam, to describe one of the dirtiest chapters in its political history.").
151 See Dennis Wagner, AzScam's Flamboyant Stedino Dies, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, July
23, 1997, at Al.
152 id.
153See Manson, supra note 150, at Al.
154 Last AzScam Figure in Prison Paroledfor Final 3 Months of Term,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 29, 1996, at BI. It is interesting to note that while Tapp is still
the owner of his bond business, Eagle-American Bail Bonds, he "wasn't planning on
returning to work at his company because it would look bad .
I..."
Id.
155 See Kahn v. McCormack, 299 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(stating that "[t]he bail bond business is subject to a variety of allegations of corruption.
The charges range from alleged tie-ins with police and court officials, involving
kickbacks for steering defendants to particular bondsmen, to collusion and corruption
aimed at setting aside forfeitures of bonds where the defendants have failed to appear.").
156See Jonathan Drimmer, America's Least Wanted: We Need New Rules To
Stop Abuses, WASH. POST, Sep. 21, 1997, at C6.
Here are some of the highly publicized incidents that have

19991

BAIL BONDSMEN

309

violating people's civil and constitutional rights, 157 bondsmen have
used unreasonable
force on their principals as well as innocent
58
victims.
One recent story of bondsmen murdering innocent citizens
took place last year. In the early morning hours of August 31, 1997,
seven men armed with semi-automatic weapons and body armor
broke into a suburban Phoenix home with a sledgehammer. 59 Upon
entering the house, a firefight ensued between the bondsmen and the
occupants. "[The bounty hunters] held children at gunpoint and killed
[a] young couple .... Their bedroom was riddled with at least 29

bullet holes."' 60 The armed men claimed they were bounty hunters
working for a California bond company and were pursuing a fugitive
who owed $25,000.161 After some investigation, however, it was
determined not only had the warrant expired months earlier, but the
seven men were not even bounty hunters.' 62 "The fact that these men
chose to disguise themselves as bounty hunters, and that their story
occurred over recent years: Bounty hunters in Kansas City broke
into the wrong home and shooting (sic) an innocent man three
times. They were searching for an African American man; the
victim was Hispanic. Bounty hunters in New York arrested an
innocent woman and took her to Alabama. Informed of their
mistake, they gave her $24 and a bus ticket home. A bounty
hunter in Boston fired his gun into the car of the wrong man.
Four armed bounty hunters burst into a motel room in Colorado,
threw two innocent people to the floor and handcuffed them.
They were only released after another motel guest called police.
Bounty hunters in Virginia broke into a house and interrogated a
woman while standing over her with semi-automatic weapons.
Bounty hunters in Kansas City broke down the door of an
innocent woman, injured her husband and sprayed her 5- and 10year-old grandsons with mace during the ensuing confrontation.
Id.

157 See supra notes 114-13 7 and accompanying text.
158 See infra notes 159-170 and accompanying text.

159 See Drimmer, supra note 157, at C6.
160 id.

161 See id.

162 See Drimmer, supra note 156, at C6 (reporting that the "Arizona
authorities now say their story [the alleged bounty hunters] was a ruse, concocted to cover
a burglary attempt. The men are in jail on first-degree murder charges.").
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seemed plausible at first blush, is only further proof of the urgent need
to change the archaic system that has left bounty hunters free to
operate with almost no oversight from state and federal courts or
163
governments."'
An example of bounty hunters not being liable for using
164
excessive force is Ozuts v. MarylandNationalInsurance Company.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision that the bounty hunters involved in the litigation were not
liable under the plaintiff's § 1983 claim. 65 Ozuts was arrested for
obtaining money under false pretenses and later released on bail. 66
When he failed to appear, a bounty hunter was hired to return him to
Nevada. 167 The bounty hunter forcibly took Ozuts into custody and
delivered him to the bondsman who had posted the bail. 168 The court
held the defendant was not liable for either the warrantless arrest or
the force used in effecting that arrest. What is relevant, however, is
that the bail contract allowed the bounty hunter to use force in
arresting the plaintiff. 69 This is unconscionable and should be void as
being against public policy. By using contracts such as this one,
bounty hunters and bail bondsmen are authorized to perpetrate acts of
force and violence on the public.
[A]s demonstrated by the numerous and repeated
incidents of misconduct, the threat of civil and
criminal liability are ineffective deterrents to bounty
hunter abuse. Because of bounty hunters' broad search
and arrest powers, criminal liability is an option only
in extreme cases. Civil liability also is a hollow threat
163Id.
'6 505
161 See
166See
167 See

F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974).
id. at 555.
id. at 549.
id.

168See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 549-50.
169The court commented that the defendant predicated his arrest on the
private bail contract and not on California statute as argued by the plaintiff. Id. at 553.
This fact is taken into account in finding no state action. Id. Indeed, it appears that the

court is allowing this use of force grounded in contract. Id.
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because most bounty hunters possess insufficient
assets to pay large damage awards, and they are not
required to buy liability insurance. (Typically, bounty
hunters are hired as independent contractors, so bail
bonding companies are not liable for their misdeeds.)
Given the common problems that arise, in conjunction
with the growth of the profession, allowing bounty
hunters to continue to pursue bail jumpers with no
governmental
oversight places the innocent public at
170
greater risk.
If we view the actions of bondsmen as being acts 'under color
of law,' they will be punished for violating the protections of the
Constitution. 171 In today's age of advanced telecommunications and
an ever-expanding police force, the legitimate
authorities are more
72
criminals.
apprehend
to
properly suited
When the practice of turning to bail bondsmen was
first instituted in the 1 9 th century, police departments
were inadequate, ill-equipped and ill-trained; ... there
was no body similar to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation;... and communications between points
separated by great distances was poor. Accordingly,
there was considerable advantage to making use of the
bail bondsmen who would 'track down' those who
jumped bail. Conditions and times have changed, as
have our views of constitutional requirements, Police
today are better qualified than in the past, and are
certainly more qualified than is the modern bondsman

170 Drimmer, supra note 156, at C6.

Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 561. This is the position argued in the dissent by
Justice Hufstedler who concluded "that [the] defendants acted under color of state law to
deprive [plaintiff] of federally protected rights .... " Id.
'71

172See Ford,257 A.2d at 669.
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to locate and recapture an accused who has jumped
bail.' 73
Moreover, when police are used to recapture fugitives, constitutional
safeguards protect criminals and innocent citizens alike. If we do not
curtail the powers of the bondsmen, the violent abuses of the past will
continue to be perpetrated on the American public. "With so much
room for abuse in their line of work, bounty hunters
shouldn't get less
74
state oversight than barbers and manicurists"

IV. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE ROUTES TO REFORM
As the, above discussion illustrates, the modem bondsman is
involved in a 'symbiotic' relationship with the government. When
discharging their powers in furtherance of this relationship, i.e.,
searching for and retrieving fugitives in return for lucrative fees, they
should be considered state actors. If their actions are attributed to the
state, citizens will be able to rightly recover for violations of their
constitutional as well as civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'
Additionally, it also appears that there is criminal infiltration of the
business and corruption being carried out by bondsmen. 7 6 These
facts, combined with acts of force being used on fugitives and
innocent citizens alike, 77 demands that we bring much needed reform
to this vital system on a national scale. Several alternatives are being
experimented with throughout the country; 78 including a uniform
79
alternative that could be adopted by all states in the union.
Some states have made the move' of simply eliminating the

173 id.
'74 Establish Limits for Bounty Hunters, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Sept. 4,

1997, at AI4.

175See

supra notes 55-113 and accompanying text.

16 See supra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
177See

supra notes 159-170 and accompanying text.
infra notes 179-232 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 220-232 and accompanying text.
178See
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for-profit bail bond system' 80 to alleviate the evils it has perpetuated
on the American public.' 8 1 In Kentucky, for example, the commercial
182
bail bonding system was outlawed in 1976 (the "Kentucky Act").'
Several critical pieces of litigation followed the passage of the
Kentucky Act.' 83 This litigation upheld the statute's constitutionality
84
under the both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions.
In Johnson Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,'8 5 the
plaintiff sought a repeal of the relevant sections of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes. He claimed that the act
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
'excessive bail'; deprives it [the plaintiff] of liberty

and property without due process of the laws; ... and
denies it equal protection of the laws in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; [and] deprives
180 See, e.g., Johnson Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., 420 F. Supp.

331 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (holding that acts of the legislature eliminating criminal sureties
does not violate the Constitution); Kahn, 299 N.W.2d at 279; Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971) (eliminating criminal sureties is a valid exercise of police power).
181See, e.g., Johnson, 420 F. Supp. at 335 ("[Blail bondsmen have, in large
part ...reaped huge profits ...to the detriment of the rights of many citizens and have
been a major cause of corruption in the administration ofjustice.").
182 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (Michie 1985), which states in part:
(1)
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the
business of bail bondsmen as defined in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.34-010(l), or to otherwise for compensation or other
consideration :
(a) Furnish bail or funds or property to serve as bail; or
(b) Make bonds or enter into undertakings as surety;
For the appearance of persons charged with any criminal offense
or violation of law or ordinance punishable by fine,
imprisonment or death, before any of the courts of this state,
including city courts, or to secure the payment of fines imposed
and of costs assessed by such courts upon a final disposition.
The statute further states that a bail bondsman, for-purposes of preceding section, is one
who is "engaged for profit in the business of furnishing bail, making bonds or entering
into undertakings, as -surety, for the appearance of persons charged with any criminal
offense or violation of law ....
" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.34-010(1)(Michie 1985).
183 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (Michie 1985).
184 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
185 420 F. Supp. 331 (E D. Ky. 1976).
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h
it of its right to contract as guaranteed by the 141
86
Amendment [to the]... United States Constitution.1

The court adjudicated the question of "whether the Kentucky
legislature could, in the exercise of its police power, reasonably
conclude that 'outlawing' the bailbonding (sic) business would further
the public welfare."' 187 In reaching its conclusion that the Act was
within the power of the legislature, the court looked to the history
behind the statute's enactment:
It [the State legislature] found, inter alia, that 'the
people of Kentucky' by ratification of the Judicial
Article mandated a reform in the administration of
justice including the pretrial release of citizens
charged with bailable offenses'; that 'bail bondsmen
have, in large part ...reaped huge profits

. . .

to the

detriment of the rights of many citizens and have been
a major cause of corruption in the administration of
justice'; and that 'the present system has otherwise
fostered widespread abuse of the laws and of the rights
of the citizens of this Commonwealth through the
corruptive influences of the bail bondsman in violation
of the spirit of the Kentucky Constitution
guaranteeing
88
justice.1
of
administration
the equal
The court first resolved that the statute was within the
legislature's police power, stating that this power "extends to all the
great public needs . .. . . It may be put forth in aid of what is

sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare."' 8 9 The Johnson Court then concluded that the
plaintiffs constitutional claims (i.e., due process violation, etc.) were
116Id. at 333.

187 Id. at 335.
188Id.

"8 9 Id. at 335.
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either foreclosed or without merit.' °
Another state which has invalidated the powers of bail
bondsmen and bounty hunters is Wisconsin.
In Kahn v.
191
McCormack,
Wisconsin bondsmen, like their Kentucky
counterparts, challenged a statute which abolished commercial
bonding within the state (the "Wisconsin Act"). 192 The court here
held that the Wisconsin Act, like Kentucky Act, was a valid exercise

of the state's police power because there existed a rational basis for
the legislation's inception.' 93 They stated that "[i]n the exercise of its

police power, the state may forbid, as inimical to the public welfare,
the prosecution of a particular type of business, or regulate a business
'' 4

in such manner as to abate evils deemed to arise from it's pursuit. 1
The court then concluded that "[lI]egislation protecting the integrity of
judicial bail determinations, which are designed to ' 95
assure the
appearance of defendants, is clearly in the public interest."'
The significance of these cases and their progeny 196 is that
there is a device available for the state to effect change in the
commercial bonding system. It is within the power of the state to
choose to abolish the system of commercial bail bonding as a method
197
of rectifying the evils it has imposed on the public.
Illinois has followed this impetus as well. In 1964, Illinois
completely abolished commercial bail bonding and replaced it with a

190 See Johnson at 336-39. "The Court is of the opinion that the unsoundness
of plaintiff's claim that the Act deprives it of property without due process of law 'so
clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject.'
Plaintiff's claim based on freedom of contract is also foreclosed." Id. at 335.
'9' 299 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
192See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.12(2) (1979). The Wisconsin Act reads in
relevant part: "No surety under this chapter may be compensated for acting as a surety."
Id.
193 See Kahn, 299 N.W.2d at 283-84 (holding that "[blecause plaintiffs have
not met their burden of proving the non-existence of any rational basis to support sec.
969.21(1) and (2), Stats., as amended, their challenge must fail.").
'94Id. at 281.
' 9' Id. at 282.
196 See Benboe v. Carroll, 494 F. Supp. 462 (W. D. Ky. 1977) aff'd, 625 F.2d
462 (6th Cir. 1980); Stephens v. Bonding Assn. of Ky., 538 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1976); Cf
City of Paducah v. Johnson Bonding Co., 512 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. App. 1974).
197 See supra, notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
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98

Prior to 1964[,] the professional bail bondsman system
with all its abuses was in full -and odorous, bloom in
Illinois. The results [of this system] were thata heavy
and irretrievable burden fell on the accused, to the
excellent profit of the bondsman, and that professional
bondsmen, and not the courts, exercised significant
control over the actual workings of the system. One of
the stated purposes of the new bail provisions in the
1963 Code was to rectifythis offensive situation. 99
Under this new system, the accused can obtain pretrial release in one
of the following three ways: 1) "he may be released on his own
personal recognizance; 200 2) he may execute, a bail bond and deposit
with the clerk cash equal to only 10% of the bail or $25, whichever is
greater";20 or 3) "he may execute a bail bond and secure it by a
deposit with the clerk of the full amount of the bail in cash, or in
stocks and bonds authorized for trust in Illinois, or by unencumbered
20 2
nonexempt Illinois real estate worth double the amount of the bail.,
Additionally, judges are no longer required to set a minimum level of
bail. 20 3 Instead, the judiciary is given great discretion and provided
19 8 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-1.
'99 Schlib, 404 U.S. at 359; see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-2.
200 See Schlib, 404 U.S. at 360; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-7.
20' Schlib, 404 U.S. at 360-61. "When bail is made in this way and the

conditions of the bond have been performed, the clerk returns to the accused 90% of the
sum deposited. The remaining 10% (1% of ihe bail) is retained by the clerk as 'bail bond
costs'." Id.; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-8(2)(6.
202 Id. at 361. "When bail is made in this way and the conditions of the bond
have been performed, the clerk returns the deposit of cash or stocks or bonds, or releases
the real estate, as the casemaybe, without charge or retention of any amount." Id. at 36162.
203 [T]he judge's discretion in such respect [i.e., in fixing bail] is
not guided by statute, rule of court or any definite, fixed
standard; various divers [sic] judges in fact fix the amount of bail
for the same types of offenses at various and divers amounts,
without relationship as to guilt. or innocence of the particular
defendant in a criminal charge, and without relationship of the
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20 4

with a rational set of guidelines.
The Illinois system was eventually attacked.

In Schlib v.

Kuebel,20 5 the Supreme Court upheld Illinois' bail statue, noting many
20 6
of the benefits which have been reaped from the new system.

Notably, criminal defendants are now required to pay 1%of the actual
cost of the bond,20 7 as opposed to 10% of the total cost of the bond.20 8

Furthermore, the Court held the 1% retention for court costs did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because "balancing ... opposing considerations in the way that [the
20 9
State Legislature] did cannot be described as lacking in rationality." 2 10
The Eighth-Amendment right to be free from excessive bail

and our modem bail system are part of the foundation of our criminal
justice system. The underlying benefit of several states moving to
dismantle the for-profit bonding system 21' in favor of a state
controlled system, is that it is helping achieve reform of this essential
part of our criminal justice system.212 By filling the void left by the
absence of bondsmen, the courts can now effectively retake control of
particular offense charged and the bail fixed.
Id.at 363-64; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-1.
204 See Schlib, 404 U.S. at 364.
205 404 U.S. 357 (1971).

206 See id.at 366 (stating that "[tihe attack on the Illinois bail statutes, in a
very distinct sense, is paradoxical. The benefits of the new system, as compared with the
old, are conceded.").
207 See id. at 358 (stating that "the amount so retained was 1% of the
specified bail and 10% of the amount actually deposited."); see also 725 ILL. COM. STAT.
ANN. 5/110-7 (West 1998).
208 See Schlib, 404 U.S. at 359 (explaining that "the bail bondsman
customarily collected the maximum fee (10% of the amount of the bond) permitted by
statute . . . and retained that entire amount even though the accused fully satisfied the
conditions of the bond").

209Id.at 367-68.
210 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted." Id.
211 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (b)(4) (Michie 1998) (judicial
official may request a deposit with the court, not to exceed 10%); D.C. CODE ANN. § 231321(a)(3) (1971) (10% deposit sufficient for pre-trial release).
212 See generally Stack, 342 U.S. at 7 (stating that bail allows the accused
to
prepare an unhampered defense and prevents punishment before being convicted of a
crime).
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213

the pre-trial release process.
Other states have opted to create licensing schemes to exercise
greater control over the commercial bail bond system. 214 Many of
these statutes aim to limit the powers of the bondsman in ways which
will ensure the vitality of the bonding system while at the same time
protecting the rights of citizens,21 5 In New Jersey, for example, there
is proposed legislation which requires "bounty hunters to submit to
background checks, to 'knock and announce' before entering, and to
carry insurance to protect victims who might be injured and want to
As far back as 1986, states like Connecticut were
sue. ' 2 16

experimenting with moderate statutory reform when they provided
"for the issuance of a rearrest warrant or mittimus 2 17 where a bond of
$500 or more is ordered forfeited because the principal failed to

213 See Schilb, 404

U.S. at 359-60 (arguing that before the passage of the

Illinois bail reform statutes, the "professional bondsman, and not the courts, [exercised]
significant control over the actual workings of the bail system").
214 See infra notes 213-30 and accompanying text. Most states which have
regained control of the bond system by stature have elected to curtail the powers of bail
bondsmen.
21' See Establish Limits for Bounty Hunters, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Sept. 4,
1997, at 14A. The author concedes that the bounty hunter fills a vital role in society and
admits that last year they returned approximately 23,000 fugitives to justice. Id
Although necessary, he demonstrates that control is essential in light of past offenses
including the murder of Chris Foote and Spring Wright in Phoenix last September. Id.
The author suggests several regulations which could be placed upon bounty hunters,
including: background checks, licensing, and "if they're stalking someone so dangerous
they feel the need to be armed, then they should be required to call police." Id.
216 Jeff Barker, US. Attorney Looks at Bounty Hunters; Federal Charges
Being Considered, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1997, at B I. It is important to note that
the discussion on statutory reform has been limited almost exclusively to the states and
some legislators feel it should stay that way. Id. One Maricopa County District Attorney
has been reported to say: "I'm not sure federalizing is the right way [to effect reform]...
[i]t's generally left to the different states. I agree there needs to be uniformity, but I'm not
sure the federal government should step up yet. I think organizations like the National
District Attorneys Association should be a driving force here." Id.
217 A mittimus is "the name of a precept in writing, issuing from a court or
magistrate, directed to the sheriff or other officer, commanding him to convey to the
prison the person named therein, and to the jailer, commanding him to receive and safely
keep such person until he shall be delivered by due course of law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).
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appear in court. ' 218 The legislature, however, avoided curbing the
bondsman's most abusive powers when they failed to "abrogate a bail
bondsman's common-law right to apprehend and surrender his
principal. 2 1 9 What this means is that the bounty hunter only needs to
get a declaration from the court stating the accused is wanted for not
appearing at trial before he apprehends his principal. While reforms
such as licensing and training willgive bounty hunters enhanced skills
and the state more knowledge of who is hunting fugitives, many
problems such as violent arrests and civil rights violations will
continue to plague the system.22°
Alternatively,, some states have held that the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act (U.C.E.A.) 221 has effectively abrogated the
powers of the bail bondsman.222 The purpose of this uniform law is to
"provide an orderly means of extradition, and to accord procedural
223
due process to persons sought to be removed from this state."
In Commonwealth v. Wilkinson,224 a foreign bondsman
225
attempted to remove his principal from the state of Massachusetts.
In doing so, the bondsman was indicted for kidnapping and assault
with a dangerous weapon.226 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the adoption of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act by the State of Massachusetts effectively abrogated
the common-law powers of a bail bondsman to arrest his or her
principal.227 In reaching its holding, the Court did not apply this new
2'8 David Nadvorney, State Court Roundup: Summaries of Selected State
High Court Decisions,NAT'L L. J., July 14, 1986, at 52.
2 19
Id.

220 See id. (citing one typical example of a civil rights violation by a
professional bail bondsman).
221 UNEW. ClUM. EXTPU.DrnON ACT §1, 11 U.L.A. 110 (1996).
222 See id. Although this statute does effectively limit the powers of the
bondsman and, more importantly, provides for a heightened recognition of procedural due
process rights, it effectively only applies to foreign bondsmen, hence its title, the Uniform
Criminal ExtraditionAct. Id
223State v. Lopez, 734 P.2d 778, 782 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
224 613 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1993).
225
See id. at 915.
226 See id.

227 See id. at 916.
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interpretation to the defendant.22 8 It reasoned that if "a judicial
construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue, it must not be given a retroactive effect." 229 It further held that
this decision was a proper interpretation of the legislature's intention
in ratifying the U.C.E.A., namely, the protection of the due process
rights of the accused.2 3 °
The court in Wilkinson reiterated the earlier holding of State v.
23
Lopez.
There, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico also held "that
the common law authority of the. bondsman to transport a principal
out-of-state, without the principal's consent, has been modified by
enactment of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 2 32
The
U.C.E.A., by limiting the broad powers of the bondsman, can help
233
alleviate the oppressive and unsavory elements of this system.
It is important to note, however, that there is authority that
argues that abridging the rights and powers of commercial bondsman
does not solve many of the problems 2 34 facing the system. 235 It is
argued that if a jurisdiction is to allow bondsmen to operate, reform
will simply harm citizens accused of committing crimes. 3
Indeed,
Mary A. Toberg states that "[m]ore stringent policies regarding the
collection of forfeitures will increase bondsmen's operating costs and
22 See Wilkinson, 613 N.E.2d at 917.

229 id.
230 See id. at 915-16 (explaining that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
"permits a person to procure the warrantless arrest of a fugitive through 'any officer
authorized to serve warrants . . . upon reasonable information that the accused stands
charged in another state with a crime. Therefore, under that statute a fugitive can be
surrendered pursuant to the request of a private bondsman and still be afforded the benefit
of due process requirements..."); see also, Lopez, 743 P.2d at 782-83 (arguing that "[t]he

legislative action [enactment of the Uniform Extradition Act] was intended to eliminate
the bail system and its attendant evils in factor of a more civilized system of apprehension
and return of accused and convicted criminals.").
23 734 P.2d 778 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
232 Id. at 782.

233See id.

234 See supra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
235See generally Toberg, supra note 93 at 141 (arguing that greater
regulation of236
the criminal bonding system will only hurt, not help, accused criminals).
See id. at 153-54.
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should make them less willing to write bonds for riskier defendants.
Consequently, unless there are offsetting forces in the jurisdiction[,]..
detention is likely to rise." 237
Ms. Toberg's research also .indicates that a statewide
regulatory environment which is unfavorable to the bondsman,
coupled with stringent forfeiture collection practices, will result in
longer amounts of time required to dispose of cases, high rates of
detention for accused who have bond amounts set as well as high
failure-to-appear rates.238 In indianapolis, Indiana, just this regulatory
environment existed. Detention rates for those where bonds were set
was 44%.239 It is important, to realize, however, that although Ms.
Toberg points out many of the positive factors of using bail
bondsmen, she fails to address many of the appalling acts committed
by bondsmen and bounty hunters in exercising their nearly
unrestricted arrest powers. The weight of the evidence compels the
conclusion that even if there are drawbacks to reform of the
commercial bail bond system, the abuses being committed by
bondsmen and bounty hunters require a change.
V. CONCLUSION

The modem commercial bail bondsman is performing a
service that is vital to our system of criminal justice. 240 In doing so,
they enter into a 'syrmbiotic' relationship with the state.24 1 Once this
is acknowledged, it is clear that the broad powers of bail bondsman
are resulting in widespread violence and violations of the public's
constitutional rights. 24T This fact, combined with the widespread
corruption within and caused by the business, draws the inevitable
conclusion that reform is desperately needed. If we do not act, the
abuses of the past will continue to be the abuses of the future. As for
237 id.

See id. at 147-52.
id.
240 See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
241See supra notes 55-1 13 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
23

239 See
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regulating the industry, several states have chosen to head in different
directions in the search for a solution to the abuses committed by
bondsmen. 243 Under a system patterned after the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, a possible "best solution" can be found.244- By letting
sureties perform their necessary function in tandem with providing
protection for citizens' constitutional guarantees, we can be more
assured that 1) an accused will have a ready vehicle to effect their
pretrial release; 2) bail bondsmen will still have a process in which
they can retrieve fugitives and return them to justice; and 3) the
constitutional and civil rights of citizens will continue to receive the
highest protection possible.
Matthew L. Kaufman

243See supra notes 179-232 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 220-232 and accompanying text.

